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Protecting Law from Morality’s 




Invited a few years ago by one of the field’s leading journals ‘to 
stimulate discussion about the nature, role and future of socio-legal 
studies’ (JLS Editors 2002: 632), Roger Cotterrell (2002) and Paddy 
Hillyard (2002), two leading socio-legal scholars, stress the connection 
between the legal and the moral. Morality, they believe, is the heart 
and soul of the law. For them, only when socio-legal studies allows the 
law-morality connection to be its guiding light is it at its strongest. To 
list five of their examples, this type of morality-to-the-fore socio-legal 
studies is open to many influences, is flexible in how it interprets these 
influences, produces a rich diversity of intellectual outcomes, expands 
the boundaries of what counts as ‘law’, and, in doing so, is a leader in 
the utilisation of the work of Michel Foucault (Cotterrell 2002: 632–9, 
Hillyard 2002: 646–50). The field would be lost, they suggest, without 
the law–morality connection. This high regard for morality — as the 
driving force of law, as the very raison d’être of socio-legal studies — is 
hardly unusual: it is the common currency of the highly influential 
brand of socio-legal scholarship that is consistent with the individual 
reason-based tradition (exemplified by John Rawls, esp. 1971) or the 
communitarian tradition (exemplified by Alisdair MacIntyre, esp. 
1988). Yet I contend it is very dangerous, threatening the role of the 
law as a vital cog in modern Western countries.
On the back of some critical remarks about Cotterrell’s and 
Hillyard’s thinking, this article argues that the ‘society’ component 
in this type of ‘law and society’ thinking — the ‘socio’ of this type 
of socio-legal studies — is far too readily allowed to serve morality 
against the law, sometimes threatening to displace the law altogether. 105
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(From now on I will use the acronym SLS in referring to the ‘type of 
socio-legal studies’ that is my target here — that is, the type that relies 
on either the individual reason-based tradition or the communitarian 
tradition.) Privileged as the fundamental locus of human interaction, 
‘the social’ in this formulation serves as a higher ground, a place from 
which to view and condemn the instrumentalism of the law, as well 
as of politics and the state. In this manner, for SLS, the social is the 
stalking horse of a universal morality of reason and community that 
is never clearly specified — one that can be used, and is used often, 
to buttress ‘critical’ arguments against instrumentalism — against, 
that is, treating the law as an instrument that works independently 
of morality, reason and community. Drawing on some research in 
intellectual history, the article argues that SLS needs to be clear about 
which ‘social’, and associated morality, is being employed in its name 
and, at the same time, that it should be wary of the potential of this 
‘social’ to minimise the role of law. Law, this is to argue, has to be 
protected from morality.
In terms of the governance of society — with society being 
understood as a distinct domain of relative liberty and security for 
individual subjects (see Wickham 2007) — law is an instrument 
operating alongside politics. In arguing this, I shall be highlighting the 
paradox that lurks in the oft-repeated exhortation that SLS engage in 
social ‘critique’ — the paradox that such ‘critique’ is actually directed 
against the very instruments that serve to create and protect the space 
in which it operates.
In the first section I offer a critical commentary on what I see as 
the weaknesses in Cotterrell’s and Hillyard’s arguments. Then, arguing 
for a more clearly focused SLS which will overcome these weaknesses, 
I address five overlapping questions in five other sections:
1.  How should SLS better understand the contraband morality 
of the social?
2.  How should it deal with the current dominance of a notion 
of morality as the universal morality of reason?
3.  How should it better understand the social?106
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4.  How should it deal it with the current dominance of a 
notion of the social based on the idea of rational communio?
5.  How should it understand instrumentalism?
I conclude with a summary statement of the course I am proposing 
for SLS.
The social on the loose
Neither Cotterrell nor Hillyard make clear what they mean by the social, 
or by morality. In singing the praises of the legal pluralist approach 
by which SLS may ‘specify a realm of the legal but not necessarily in 
categorical fashion’, Cotterrell (2002) says this approach helps situate 
‘law’s ultimate authority’ by assessing ‘how far it corresponds with, 
or meets, felt needs for regulation of social relations’. Is this to suggest 
that law is related to the social in the name of some ultimate, universal 
morality of reason? There is not enough evidence in this one snippet 
to answer this question, but later, when Cotterrell pointedly rejects the 
idea of law as an instrument ‘acting on society’, a ‘Yes’ answer looks 
likely. And when he takes this point further, to reject law as a force 
‘external to social life’ in favour of ‘law as normative ideas embedded 
in social practices’, a ‘Yes’ answer is certain (Cotterrell 2002: 637–8). 
For Cotterrell, I suggest, the social functions as both an ontology and 
a universal morality of reason. He confirms this when he urges that 
more attention be paid to Durkheimian investigations into the ‘moral 
foundations of law’. He goes so far as to say that this approach can 
be the ‘basis for a powerful moral critique of law’ (Cotterrell 2002: 
640–1).
In Cotterrell’s conception, the social rules law and politics, not the 
other way around. Law and politics are to be measured against (and 
found wanting in terms of) the social, which is representative of a 
universal morality of reason somehow floating above us or within us. 
The fact that in the Durkheimian account this morality is said to be a 
collective human product makes little difference. The Durkheimian 
account gives the collective conscience the same ultimate universality 
granted in the accounts of the metaphysicians to the power of reason, 107
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sometimes via the mysteries of God. The social appears to be this 
universal morality’s servant on earth. Law and politics are rendered 
social, to be assessed in terms of an ultimate, universal sociality of 
reason. In other words, Durkheim ends up providing a sociological 
equivalent for Kantian morality. He takes Kant’s idea that morality 
be thought of in terms of the collective willing of a community of 
rational beings (the ‘kingdom of ends’) and transforms it by finding 
‘sociological’ equivalents for the willing in the ritual consciousness 
of mythic societies.
On a slightly different matter, I cannot see why we should follow 
Cotterrell’s advice and have SLS ‘help to redraw the legal map, 
emphasizing how and why the changing character of the social in 
transnational and intranational contexts forces changes in structures 
of regulation’ (Cotterrell 2002: 642).
‘The law’, for the argument I am presenting here, refers to an 
ensemble of juridical institutions operating inside the security envelope 
of the state and, while perfectly concrete, this ensemble should not 
be thought of as ‘part of’ some organic social whole. More than this, 
it is an instrument that is used to help rule the social. Changes in the 
historical disposition of concrete forms of living may well be said to 
lead to changes in the nature of law, or be said to be governed by 
such changes, but not in a way that suggests a leading role for SLS. 
SLS should seek to describe such shifts as carefully as possible, but 
should certainly not seek to lead them, as if it has access to a privileged 
domain of the social that gives it some kind of moral or intellectual 
privilege in legal and political arenas. It hardly needs adding that I do 
not think SLS should be searching out ‘sources of moral authority’ 
for ‘new transnational legal forms’ or, more generally, that it needs 
to ‘reassert links between law and morality, viewing morality as the 
varied conditions of solidarity necessary to the diverse kinds of relations 
of community that comprise the social’ (Cotterrell 2002: 642–3). 
The law’s authority is, rather, a contingent historical artefact of its 
contingent historical development — this is all it needs and all it can 
expect. In all this, as one of my anonymous referees pointed out to me, 108
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the law is not distinct from its practice, where it deals with ‘social’ and 
‘moral’ questions all the time. My point is that the law deals with these 
questions by, quite literally, ruling on them. In this sense, I should stress 
that my argument is particularly focused on public law, as captured 
historically by Martin Loughlin’s detailed study (Loughlin 2003) and 
politically by, for example, Jeremy Webber’s defence of public law as 
a component of democratic rule (Webber 2006). I will later say a little 
more about the importance of public law to my argument.
With this understanding of law, the search for ‘higher’ moral 
authority in the name of the social, and in the name of reason, is not 
necessary. Indeed, as I said earlier, it is dangerous. Both the social and 
the relations of community that comprise it are objects of government 
by the state, not realms which somehow provide a moral haven from 
such government. With Hillyard, we can see the conversion of the 
putative intellectual and moral privilege into the advocacy of moral 
indignation. Hillyard is even more explicit than Cotterrell about the 
centrality of an ultimate, universal morality of reason that supposedly 
underpins the social: ‘the future direction of sociolegal research should 
be informed by less theory and more moral indignation’ (2002: 646). 
The role of theory may need to be recast, but the field needs more 
moral indignation like a hole in the head. Hillyard is a very good social 
scientist and very good socio-legal thinker. As such, he should be 
aware that moral indignation runs in many directions. It was precisely 
to overcome the effects of the excesses involved in clashes of rival 
moral indignations that modern public law was developed (Loughlin 
2003: 134–52). I think Hillyard is also mistaken in attempting to 
tie the empirical study of ‘the material realities of everyday life’ to 
a supposedly universal ‘social’ morality of the law; in attempting 
to make ‘social inequality’ not only the main focus of SLS but also 
the proof of law’s ‘immorality’; and in attempting, as part of this, to 
equate the notion of justice to a supposedly universal morality — a 
universal justice (Hillyard 2002: 651–6). To talk of ‘everyday life and 
its material realities’ should not be code for ‘a necessarily special space’, 
as it seems to be for Hillyard. Everyday life and its realities are most 
certainly important objects of law’s rule, but they are not important 109
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because they contain a moral pattern for the way law operates or 
should operate. ‘Everyday life’ is just a name for that which we have 
not yet begun to think about or deal with. Attempting to alleviate 
social inequality is a vital part of the government of modern states. It 
might be argued that in some or all of these states this process is not 
going as well as it should be, or that it is being stalled by governments 
taking the wrong direction. But this is certainly not to say that law is 
immoral. To say so strikes me as a far-fetched argument which is far 
too reliant on an ultimate, universal social morality of reason against 
which law’s performance as a device of government can be judged 
(and found wanting). Justice is important, but if it is stripped of its 
empirical centre in law and politics as they have historically developed 
in modern states it will be weakened to the point of fantasy or, worse, 
strengthened to the point of fanaticism.
Three other weaknesses should be highlighted. The first concerns 
the role of theory. Here the two authors ostensibly diverge. Where, 
as we saw, Hillyard wants less theory in SLS (to make room for more 
moral indignation), Cotterrell (2002: 636) wants more — ‘to address 
the nature of contemporary law’, to help it ‘to map and organize the 
sociolegal realm’. While this looks at first glance like a potentially 
interesting argument between our authors, their joint reliance on 
an ultimate, universal social morality of reason strips the argument 
of its potential. Their ostensible disagreement actually dissolves as 
their reliance on a social morality of reason leads them to avoid the 
historical work needed to explore that disagreement. Anyone seeking a 
balance between theory and empirical work must at least acknowledge 
the historical circumstances in which the separation between theory 
and fact was formed, and neither Cotterrell nor Hillyard does this. 
There is not the room in this piece for me to discuss either the ancient 
or modern history of this core dualism in Western thought (for a 
stimulating account of the rise and rise of ‘theory’ as a separate sphere 
of intellectual endeavour, see Hunter 2006). However, there is room 
for me to say why an awareness of the history of the dualism between 
theory and empirical work is needed in this debate. To take a position 
without it, one way or the other, risks falling into one of the two 110
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arms of this particular trap of social critique — the trap of making 
‘theory’ a space in which sage-like figures (‘theorists’) can somehow 
rise above empirical necessity (Cotterrell), or the trap of endorsing an 
almost anti-intellectual veneration of ‘the facts’, as if they can speak 
for themselves (Hillyard).
Finally we come to the role in SLS of the considerable body of 
work by and around Foucault. Our authors are here, too, ostensibly 
at loggerheads. While, as noted, Hillyard (2002: 648–51) finds some 
aspects of Foucault’s work appealing, he does not like the pervasive 
influence Foucault has had on SLS, and not just because it is yet another 
example of a theorist pushing too much theory. He is particularly 
concerned about the dominance of the Foucaultian account of power. 
While he does not want to dispense with this account altogether, 
he thinks it is ultimately flawed in that it does not allow SLS ‘to 
differentiate between forms and strengths of power’. Cotterrell (2002: 
637–9), by comparison, is a big fan of Foucault. He sees much to 
admire in the Foucaultian literature, including the work on power: 
‘As Foucault revolutionized views of power, sociolegal scholarship 
should revolutionize views of law’. Cotterrell is especially taken with 
the possibilities for SLS contained in the literature around Foucault’s 
neologism ‘governmentality’. He thinks this is a positive way to deal 
with ‘the complex inter-relations between, on the one hand, actions 
of state agencies at many levels and “private” disciplinary strategies 
and normalizing practices that pervade social life’.
I think both authors overestimate Foucault. In light of Ian Hunter’s 
(1998) critical comments, Foucault and his followers’ ‘governmentality’ 
work looks too much like the ‘over-sociological’ theories these 
followers are keen to reject. By this I mean that the ‘governmentality’ 
body of work, like ‘over-sociological’ work more generally, allows the 
social to dominate the political and the legal, not allowing the space 
for these other categories to operate independently (I have developed 
these arguments against Foucault’s treatment of law elsewhere: 
Wickham 2006a).111
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I turn now to the task of answering the five questions I posed in the 
introduction. My answers, I reiterate, amount to an argument about 
the need for SLS to rethink its approach to the social (or society) and its 
associated morality, and in so doing to revive the autonomy of law and 
politics — in sum, to ‘make law central’ in ways Cotterrell’s subtitle 
(‘Making Law Central’) promises but does not deliver. In line with 
this, my answers add up to a need for SLS to more fully appreciate the 
importance of instrumentalism.
A strategy for SLS to deal with the 
contraband morality of the social
SLS should thoroughly historicise morality in order to separate it from 
the sphere of the social, and when it does so it will discover that society 
does not provide the kind of moral-ontological bedrock assumed for 
it. Of great interest here is Blandine Kriegel’s The State and the Rule 
of Law (1995), an investigation of some early modern statist thinking, 
particularly in France and Britain (she is referring especially to Bodin 
and Hobbes; I will shortly add to this list two early modern German 
thinkers, Pufendorf and Thomasius). She borrows from Nietzsche the 
insight that when ‘the Greco-Roman heritage lost its early appeal ... 
it was Judeo-Christianity that became the moral tutor of the West’ 
(Kriegel 1995: 53), but not before she strips it of its romantic anti-
statism by insisting that Judeo-Christianity be considered only in terms 
of its use by the early modern statist theorists.
Kriegel (1995: 33–4) takes us first through the history of a particular 
understanding of human rights, or individual rights, as the early 
moderns called them. The idea of human rights, she argues, did not 
spring suddenly from the loins of the eighteenth-century reformers 
and revolutionaries; we should not think of such rights as the product 
of the democratic and liberal thinking of this later period. Rather, we 
should focus on some early modern French and English theorists, who 
developed ‘a doctrine of individual right’ that is not individualistic in 
the liberal sense or populist in the democratic sense; it is not social, but 
statist. It is concerned with ‘the relationship between, and the limits 112
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of, the rights of authorities and the rights of individuals’. For Kriegel, 
it was the breakthroughs made by these early moderns that made the 
eighteenth-century thinking possible.
Kriegel (1995: 34) also argues that the idea of the human being 
entailed in the notion of human rights is biblical. The Old Testament 
understood humans to be joined to God in a covenant. The New 
Testament added the idea that each individual has ‘inalienable value’, 
an idea not found, Kriegel emphasises, among the ancient Greeks 
or Romans. The early modern jurists, she tells us, took the idea of 
‘the supreme dignity of the human being’ and developed it into ‘the 
process by which slavery became indefensible’. They ‘obstinately and 
patiently established the foundations for personal security and liberty, 
those fundamental rights that enabled us to emancipate ourselves from 
the state of war and servitude, and which we today take for granted’. 
The Jewish component, Kriegel adds, is very much a legal component. 
The Jews developed law as a ‘path to securing their future ... The 
law, in sum, transcends territory and defeat and the ephemeral lives 
of individuals; it assures, so long as it is safeguarded and transmitted, 
the perpetuation of an identity’ (Kriegel 1995: 37).
Explicitly linking this to later Christian thinking on the necessity 
of faith, Kriegel argues further that faith was the other vital piece of 
historical machinery that the early moderns inherited and fashioned 
into building blocks for the modern state. This is not to say, of course, 
that they took on the notion of faith exactly as they found it, simply 
tacking it onto the law. Instead they allowed faith to have a vital role 
alongside law precisely by privatising religion: ‘The modern state 
... left to the individual and to the church the task of salvation and 
concerned itself with justice alone’ (Kriegel 1995: 37). On the back of 
this, the ‘juridical sphere ... enjoyed considerable expansion: collective 
law had been extended to areas where only fragmentary rights had 
been acknowledged; a general system had taken the place of piecemeal 
rules with limited application; political right, in sum, had emerged to 
overtake civil law’ (Kriegel 1995: 61).113
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A strategy for SLS to deal with the current 
dominance of a notion of morality as 
the universal morality of reason
Here I make considerable use of Hunter’s Rival Enlightenments (2001) to 
help make clear the current dominance of universalist (sociological and 
metaphysical) conceptions of reason. Citing Kriegel, Hunter (2001: 12) 
criticises the continuing, combined effects of metaphysical philosophy 
and dialectical historiography. He concentrates on seventeenth-century 
Germany after the Treaty of Westphalia, especially on the efforts 
of Pufendorf and Thomasius to build a civil philosophy. This civil 
philosophy, he argues, was developed as a rival to the then-dominant 
metaphysical philosophy. This is no stroll through the past, despite its 
erudition. While much of the furniture of modern law and politics 
appears to be firmly of this world, Hunter argues that the gains of 
the early modern statist thinkers have been whittled away by an 
ongoing metaphysical ‘fightback’ beginning with Liebniz and Wolff, 
immediately in the wake of the civil philosophers’ work, but pushed 
along most forcefully by Kant and his followers from the middle of the 
eighteenth century onwards. Hunter argues that this fightback is still 
having its pernicious effects, both through dialectical historiography 
and through those forms of social theory that perpetuate metaphysical 
conceptions of reason. For example, in posing a criticism that is 
not difficult to apply to SLS, Hunter (2001: ix–x) says that ‘the all-
assimilating, all-unifying mill of dialectical philosophical history ... 
gives shape not just to history, but also to the [analyst of history] … 
Under these intellectual conditions, the [analyst] views the past in 
terms of the unreconciled oppositions — between rationalism and 
voluntarism, intellectualism and empiricism — and finds his or her 
own ethical impulse in the need to repeat the moment of their Kantian 
reconciliation’.
In adopting this approach, Hunter is concerned to combat modern 
moral philosophy. Much of this branch of modern philosophy, he 
argues, was initiated as a direct challenge to the early modern civil 
philosophers. It was directed particularly at what Hunter sees as the 114
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greatest achievement of these early moderns: substituting a worldly 
pragmatic political end — the preservation of social peace — for the 
suffocating morality of human reason (2001: 12). By Hunter’s way 
of thinking, the state ‘was not born to combat human sinfulness’, 
and the goal of politics is not to attain ‘general moral and economic 
well-being’ or true community, but rather to attain ‘political order’, 
leading to social peace. Hunter (2001: 252–3) is adamant that it is 
this instrumentalist achievement that modern moral philosophy seeks 
to overturn, by demanding for itself the sole carriage of all matters 
of ‘reason’, insisting that ‘reason’ cannot be separated from morality 
and that morality cannot be separated from sociality. For Hunter, 
in other words, modern moral philosophy and social theory are the 
continuation of traditional metaphysical philosophy by other means. 
As noted above, most of his fire is directed at Kant and the Kantians. 
This is a long and fascinating argument, and one which we cannot 
follow too far; I borrow from it only what is necessary for my purposes 
— the formulation of a means to productively restrict the scope of 
the social as it is relevant to SLS, especially to restrict its reliance on 
the idea of a universal morality of reason (the following argument, 
unless otherwise specified, is drawn from Hunter 2001: 20, 271–304, 
312–29, 340, Hunter: 2003).
Hunter wants us to understand the impact of those of Kant’s 
arguments that take human reason as the model for God, as opposed 
to taking God as the model for human reason. For Hunter this is 
something of a conjuring trick as Kant actually takes his conception of 
human reason from the traditional metaphysical conception of God — 
God the divine intellect, creator of the intelligible forms (or noumena) 
that it itself intuits. But more than a simple conjuring trick, it is the basis 
of a move whereby modern scholars, including modern SLS scholars, 
attempt to elevate their own normative adoption of Kantian moral 
philosophy. By this argument Hunter means to challenge all those who 
elevate the norms they have inherited from Kant, whether wittingly or 
unwittingly, over any empirical description of the actual step they are 
taking in making the Kantian move. Hunter thus targets those who are 
keen to steer well clear of the idea that in taking this step they are the 115
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children of a particular form of north German religious rationalism, 
one with its own political project — to overturn the achievements of 
the civil philosophers. In other words, the problem Hunter is dealing 
with is not that a Kantian morality is a competitor to a morality 
gathered together by the early moderns; this is not sour grapes over a 
big loss in some war of moralities. Rather the problem is that Kantian 
moral philosophy seeks to overturn the early moderns’ strict separation 
of law and politics on the one hand from morality on the other (see 
also Wickham 2006b). To adopt David Saunders’s (Saunders 2002: 
2179) delightful turn of phrase, in a piece that seeks to reinvigorate the 
idea of the law’s autonomy, where Pufendorf and other early moderns 
had worked tirelessly to combat the idea that law and politics are part 
of ‘a stairway to salvation’, Kant rebuilt the stairway but moved it to 
a different part of the house (see also Saunders 1997).
The Kantian position effectively serves as a defence of the universal 
morality of human reason precisely by denying the need for such a 
defence. It promotes itself as simply the expression of human reason, 
a force so fundamental it needs no defence. Certainly it rejects any 
defence that uses the realm of the empirical, for it holds that it alone 
commands the empirical, in the name of human reason. By this 
‘defence by not being a defence’ (which, it is has to be said, has worked 
for over two hundred years), the realm of the noumenal — divine 
intellection and a universe of pure rational beings — is supposedly 
beyond human understanding. Yet it can also, it seems, serve as the 
standpoint from which moral judgments are undertaken, including 
the judgments of many of those working in SLS.
The notion of homo duplex is being asked to do a lot of work here. 
Basically, this is the Platonic anthropological premise that human 
beings have two natures — one a sensuous nature, which has us deal 
with the brute realities of life as it is experienced in time and space, the 
other a rational or intelligible nature, which not only has us deal with 
the world through the application of reason but also supposedly allows 
us to participate in divine reason and will. Hunter says that this Platonic 
anthropology was, crucially, the anthropology of German university 116
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metaphysics in Kant’s time. Kant did more than learn it, however. It 
became the anthropological underpinning of his moral philosophy. In 
particular, just as it allowed German metaphysics to perform the task of 
ethical self-formation, producing in its adherents a vision of themselves 
as pure rational beings with the capacity to overcome the weaknesses 
that flow from the ‘other’ side of human nature — the sensuous or 
empirical side — so it performed this task in Kant’s philosophy. In 
this way, the notion of transcendence through reason (transcendence 
of the ‘lower’ self, but ultimately of all matters empirical) is not only 
passed on to others, as a sort of ethical grooming; it is also actively 
fostered in the self through a type of permanent dissatisfaction, a will 
to critique (for more on the idea of ethical grooming see also Brown 
1988, Hadot 1995). We need not go into any more detail, but I note 
in passing that this is what seems to me to be going on with many of 
the moves Cotterrell and Hillyard make, and urge others to make.
A strategy for SLS to deal with the social?
SLS might begin to reform its approach to the role of society, or the 
social, by heeding Kriegel’s (1995: 5 n27) concern about what the 
romantic version of the social did to perceptions of the state: ‘The 
state came to be viewed as an inert but complex mechanism dedicated 
to social reproduction; its motions are all reactive, parasitic on the 
active forces of society ... sucking the life from the social organism’. 
From the beginning of the nineteenth century, she continues, ‘[t]he 
word “social” would from now on cover everything’, such that ‘the 
romantic theorem of an immanent society’ became the overwhelming 
intellectual force in social thinking (1995: 116–7). She laments the fact 
that, under the pervasive influence of romanticism, so many modern 
scholars seem unable to see that ‘collectivity has been reduced to society 
and politics seen as nothing if it is not social ... We have forgotten 
that the social is not the whole’ (1995: 118). In SLS this unfortunate 
tendency seems overwhelming.
Hunter (2001; 66 n34) thinks the most damaging effect of this 
problematic version of the social is its role in promoting a form of 117
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history that ‘treat[s] civil philosophy as a defective expression of 
society and reason’, the form that ignores the vital ‘relation between 
the juridical and political dimensions of civil philosophy’. He condemns 
social thinking for treating the ‘political-jurisprudential character 
of civil philosophy’ as part of some ‘cultural-historical “failure”’, a 
failure to ground ‘law and politics in a democratically self-governed 
... “public sphere”’. Hunter (2001: 66–7) argues further that this false 
social vision of seventeenth-century civil philosophy blinds us to 
this style of philosophy’s ‘(statist) political-jurisprudential character’ 
and imposes ‘a historical dynamic which is intrinsically oriented to a 
self-governing society or a self-governing reason’. For Hunter, as for 
Kriegel of course, ‘early modern politics and jurisprudence cannot 
be explained either in terms of a theory of ... society or in terms of 
a philosophy of subjectivity’. Law and politics cannot be viewed as 
simply epiphenomena of a social-moral ontology; they must be treated 
as irreducible institutional domains whose independence is itself an 
historical achievement arising from the desacralisation of politics in the 
early modern period. This is to say that SLS should not only historicise 
the social, it should historicise it by recovering the autonomy of law 
and politics.
While Hunter does not in any way dispute Kriegel’s arguments 
against the insidious effects of German romanticism, he heads in a 
different direction by investigating an underlying assumption of the 
romantic movement — the assumption of the Platonic anthropology of 
homo duplex, which we met earlier. His main focus is on the supposed 
superiority of reason — on the idea that reason can overcome the 
effects of our voluntaristic nature. For Hunter, Platonism has been 
able to continue to exert its sway largely, though not wholly, because 
of the way it was taken up and adapted in Christian metaphysics. He 
introduces the theme that a ‘Christian–Platonic pursuit of pure rational 
being ... drove metaphysical philosophy for Liebniz through Wolff to 
Kant and beyond’ (2001: x). Of especial interest to him, of course, is the 
way in which this package was used by the early modern metaphysical 
philosophers as part of their campaign to ward off the challenge from 
early modern civil philosophy. The ‘metaphysical anthropology of homo 118
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duplex’ allowed ‘them to explicate the Christian mysteries and reveal 
the pure concepts of morality and justice underlying the civil order’. 
On this basis, ‘they claimed authority to limit the governance of the 
earthly city in accordance with the laws of its divine archetype, thereby 
advancing the interests of the academic-clerical estate’ (2001: 28). As 
such, he suggests, the metaphysicians encouraged an understanding 
of sociality based on ‘pure concepts of morality and reason’. By this 
way of thinking, people come together, as ‘society’, under the cover of 
pure reason-based morality, such that ‘disorder’ and ‘disharmony’ are 
sheeted home to a failure to overcome the effects of our voluntaristic 
nature — that is, to the failure to fully realise or exercise our capacity 
to reason. (I have elsewhere developed, as I hinted earlier, an extensive 
argument in favour of historically restricting the notion of the social, 
or society, as it is most commonly employed in the ‘socio’ disciplines, 
especially sociology: Wickham 2007.)
A strategy for SLS to deal with the currently 
dominant understanding of the social 
based on the idea of rational community
In seeking to recover the autonomy of law and politics, SLS should also 
seek to recover the most viable alternative to the Christian-Platonic 
version of sociality available to it. This is the one that was developed 
by the early modern thinkers as laid out above. Thomasius puts the 
thinking behind its development extremely clearly:
[N]othing has been more responsible for derailing man’s natural pursuit of 
a long and happy earthly life than the mixing and confusion of these two 
kinds of truth; from this have arisen shameful exercises of priestcraft with 
all their attendant misery of religious tyranny and conflict ... [Thomasius 
targets especially] those who inherited the pagan philosophical conception 
of nature and mixed it with the Christian doctrine of creation — that is, 
the metaphysicians. Ensnared by ‘Platonic fables,’ the metaphysicians not 
only produced a bastard philosophical-theological conception of a creation 
divided into visible and invisible things, they also used their alleged insight 119
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into transcendent being as the basis for doctrine-mongering and religious 
oppression (Thomasius, quoted in Hunter 2001: 85).
Hunter argues that in attacking metaphysical philosophy’s reliance 
on the Christian–Platonic package in this way, Thomasius was engaged 
in nothing less than the ground-clearing stage of an attempt to build 
a different intellectual ethos, one ‘suited to the jurists and politici of 
the desacralised state’ (Hunter 2001: 10 n34). This would certainly be 
a better focus for SLS than fostering social critique. In building this 
alternative account of the social, the early modern civil philosophers 
‘enabled its bearers to separate their own deepest religious and moral 
convictions from the formulation of laws aimed solely at civil security’. 
In this way, through the effective ‘privatisation’ of religion — in this 
case insisting that people’s religious beliefs not interfere with their now 
separate ‘desacralised’ public duties — civil philosophy helped ground 
‘the new doctrines of territorial sovereignty and desacralised politics 
in a specific intellectual deportment’ (Hunter 2001: 28).
This ‘detranscendentalising’ of politics and law further marks the 
alternative version of sociality — whereby the social must be ruled 
rather than fostered, governed rather than celebrated — as a vital 
resource for SLS, if it is to be effective in this world. At the heart of the 
alternative is an Epicurean ‘anti-metaphysical voluntarism’ by which 
‘Pufendorf and Thomasius denied ... the transcendent truths of man’s 
moral nature or moral community’ in favour of an understanding 
of ‘his limitless capacity for mutual self-destruction’ (Hunter 2001: 
89; see also Epicurus 1993, 1994, Joy 1987, Osler 1991). Pufendorf, 
Hunter says, in acknowledging him as the principal thinker behind 
the alternative,
characterises natural man as a creature whose weakness ... necessitates 
sociality for survival but whose ‘vices render dealing with him risky and 
make great caution necessary to avoid receiving evil from him instead 
of good.’ Unlike the beasts, man’s appetites for sex and food are limitless 
and impossible to satisfy. Moreover: ‘Many other passions and desires are 
found in the human race unknown to the beasts, as, greed for unnecessary 
possessions, avarice, desire of glory and surpassing others, envy, rivalry 120
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and intellectual strife. It is indicative that many of the wars by which the 
human race is broken and bruised are waged for reasons unknown to the 
beasts’ ... Man’s petulance, his capacity for giving and receiving offence, 
combined with his extraordinary capacity for violence, makes his natural 
condition a very dangerous one, particularly when one takes into account 
the great divisions in human beliefs and ways of life. In short: ‘Man, then, 
is an animal with an intense concern for his own preservation, needy by 
himself, incapable of protection without the help of his fellows, and very 
well fitted for the mutual provision of benefits. Equally, however, he is at 
the same time malicious, aggressive, easily provoked and as willing as he 
is able to inflict harm on others’ ... Man’s life in the state of nature would 
thus indeed be miserable, unadorned, and short. It would not, however, 
be ungoverned by natural law or bereft of friendship as a primitive form 
of sociality. This is because man is indeed equipped by nature to know 
the natural law, even if he is not equipped to govern himself in accordance 
with it (Hunter 2001: 171–2; see also Hunter 2003, 2004, Hunter and 
Saunders 2003a, 2003b).
SLS would do well to see that Pufendorf is thereby offering to 
it a complex account of the social as simultaneously the outcome of 
human desire for companionship, the site of the worst excesses of 
human passions, and the site of the governance of those passions, by a 
combination of law and politics. By this account, humans are drawn 
into a realm of sociality and have, at one and the same time, and at all 
times, the urge to destroy the benefits of this sociality and the capacity 
to effectively govern this urge.
A strategy for SLS to deal with instrumentalism
I have already indicated the way in which SLS might better understand 
instrumentalism — by treating law and politics as autonomous 
instruments used in building the type of state that fosters and protects 
individual liberty — but to fully outline a strategy for SLS to deal with 
instrumentalism I need to emphasise seven further points.
The first is Hunter’s attempt to counter the bad press instrumentalism 
has received since the end of the seventeenth century. He says that we 
should, ‘through a protracted exercise in intellectual reconstruction’, 121
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not think of the early modern instrumentalism as an unfortunate lapse, 
but rather as a ‘difficult achievement’ (Hunter 2001: 68).
Second is Kriegel’s summary of the careful distinction the early 
moderns drew between law and right, such that a right cannot possibly 
be an instrument without the operation of law; it is law that is the 
crucial instrument (Kriegel 1995: 62 n27).
A third and closely related point is that ‘desacralisation assumed 
a specific and limited form — that of ‘juridification’ — as a result of 
the fact that Protestant political jurists were forced to deal with the 
staggering problems of confessional politics and religious civil war in 
the only way they could, by juridifying them’. This use of law as an 
instrument, Hunter (2001: 82 n34) tells us, was not born of ‘secular-
rational philosophy’, or ‘Roman law as such’, but of the ‘unique set 
of intellectual and historical circumstances’ whereby, ‘once it became 
abundantly clear that the religious wars were incapable of theological 
adjudication or military-political termination, Protestant jurists 
developed a series of measures designed to end the conflicts by securing 
the coexistence of the confessions within the legal framework of the 
Empire’. These developments, we should be clear, ‘were not the result 
of transcendent philosophical reflection whose culmination would 
come in the democratic natural law theories of the Aufklärung’. Rather, 
‘they arose as unplanned consequences of a whole series of juridical 
improvisations undertaken by anonymous political jurists seeking the 
political-legal bases of social peace’ (Hunter 2001: 84). In other words, 
the type of law I am discussing in this article is made up of a set of 
mechanisms of rule, forged in extremely difficult circumstances, to 
operate alongside political mechanisms — albeit often in great tension 
with them, a point to be taken up in more detail shortly — to help 
restrain human violence and deliver greater security and liberty to a 
greater number of subjects. In this way, in criticising SLS, I am not 
criticising law per se.
Our fourth point is Kriegel’s extensive treatment of sovereignty 
(1995: 15–32), a vital part of her defence of the state. She rescues an 
instrumentalist understanding of sovereignty in criticising the anti-122
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statist tendency to confuse it with absolutism. She pays special attention 
to the early moderns’ argument that ‘public offices belong neither to 
lords nor to a prince, nor to a state, for they are the state itself’ (1995: 
26–7). Warming to her theme, Kriegel (1995: 27) compares what the 
early moderns achieved, with their understanding of sovereignty as a 
mix of law and politics, to what the later, nineteenth-century ‘social’ 
philosophers achieved by linking ‘politics formally to economics’:
This rejection of the doctrine of the independence ... of politics ... is the 
point of departure for later ‘social’ theory. The notion of the ‘power of 
property,’ of the spirit of the laws as the spirit of property, has in the wake 
of Marx been applied to all forms of society. The jurists had applied it 
only to feudalism. It is no exaggeration to say that social theory exercises 
a return to the seignorial doctrine; having shed its commitment to the 
independence of the legal and political realm, it winds up holding that 
the social is all there is (Kriegel 1995: 27).
Fifth on our list is the idea of law and politics operating together, 
an idea taken up by Kriegel and Hunter in quite different ways. For 
Kriegel (1995: 58–9), the early moderns, in seeking ‘to juridify the 
political sphere’, transformed ‘the essence of politics’, eschewing a 
return to classical models in favour of ‘entirely original objectives’: ‘to 
discern ... the proper ... amount and distribution of power itself’. To be 
more precise, the early moderns, as ‘doctrinarians of sovereignty and 
defenders of the rule of law, kept the link between power and law that 
was forged by feudalism, but they inverted the relationship between 
the two. Instead of trying to balance laws with powers, they subjected 
power to law and in so doing civilized the law’. By Hunter’s arguments 
(and mine), the relationship between law and politics is tenser than this. 
For him, inasmuch as ‘the relation between political and jurisprudential 
conceptions of the desacralisation of civil governance ... holds the key 
to understanding what is meant by “civil” in civil philosophy’ (2001: 
74 n34), attempts to juridify politics should be understood as always 
being matched by, or countered by, attempts to politicise law, and vice 
versa. In furthering this line of argument, Hunter (2001: 83–4) talks 
of the development of German public or political law, Staatsrecht, as a 
‘specifically juridical autonomising of political governance’. In this way, 123
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he sees the coming together of law and politics as the union of two 
‘independent strategies ... each drawing on the intellectual resources 
at its disposal in order to forge instruments capable of meeting the 
challenge to governance posed by religious civil war’.
Our sixth point is Hunter’s debt to the work of Carl Schmitt. He 
sees Schmitt as an ally in ‘the “intellectual civil war” between civil 
and metaphysical philosophy’, inasmuch as Schmitt ‘deliberately targets 
post-Kantian “political Romanticism” for its treatment of historical 
politics as the manifestation of transcendental-subjective categories, 
thereby reducing the contestation between political enemies to an 
a-political debate over the good life’ (Hunter 2001: 11, see also Schmitt 
1976, 1986). Of course, Hunter is not taking on board Schmitt’s 
unfortunate tendency to push his arguments towards their totalitarian 
extreme. For Hunter, as for Kriegel and for me, arguments such as 
those being put here are much more useful for promoting a style of 
political centrism — one that respects the need for authority and sees 
in its careful exercise the greatest likelihood of delivering widespread 
security and liberty for individual subjects — than for promoting 
totalitarianism.
Finally, we have Hunter’s (2001: 77–9) argument that the 
‘desacralisation of politics’ was ‘not the reflex expression of an epochal 
philosophical breakthrough or general rationalisation of society’. He 
draws especially on the work of Horst Dreitzel, who seeks to resuscitate 
the thinking of the seventeenth-century political theorist Henning 
Arnisaeus: ‘Arnisaeus conceives of political order as the historical 
form of rule or domination characteristic of a particular kind of 
society ... not as a constitutional order imposing normative limits on 
the prince’s conduct, but as an empirical reality whose maintenance 
constitutes the “scientific” end of the prince’s political action’. Hunter 
concludes that this secularisation of politics was the result of a pointedly 
instrumentalist move:
In reconstructing politics in terms of the instrumental maintenance 
of any historically existing form of rule, Arnisaeus sought to render it 
autonomous of scholastic moral philosophy in general. In particular he 124
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sought to free politics from its Aristotelian conception as the form of 
rule required to realise man’s moral nature or his moral communio ... to 
make the concept of the state independent of all moral-philosophical and 
religious foundations ... to autonomise politics by expelling the church 
from the state, seizing that eternal ecclesiological stalking-horse — the 
moral community — and transforming it from the source of sovereign 
power into the latter’s main target (Hunter 2001: 78).
Taken together, these seven points help further our understanding 
of what SLS might achieve by ditching its reliance on the idea of a 
universal social backed by a universal morality of reason.
Conclusion
Having carefully specified the target of my remarks — the type of 
socio-legal studies that relies on either the individual reason-based 
tradition or the communitarian tradition, both of which place morality 
at the centre of their concerns, which I have referred to throughout as 
SLS — I have developed an argument towards the proposition that SLS 
needs to completely reinvigorate the prefix ‘socio’. My argument has it 
that the best way to do this is to retrieve from early modern Europe the 
hard-won autonomy of law and politics. This autonomising was crucial 
for the development of the politico-legal governing arrangements that 
protect life and limb in modern Western countries, thereby creating 
and protecting the space in which SLS itself operates. No longer should 
SLS fear instrumentalism. Rather, it should study it carefully, for it was 
precisely in developing law and politics as instruments, in the manner 
described above, that some early modern thinkers, always under the 
threat that religious civil violence would become worse than it already 
was, were able to work towards the aforementioned set of governing 
arrangements. Equally, SLS should not condemn these governing 
arrangements for their this-worldly mix of politics and law — should 
not treat them as a major impediment to the process whereby human 
society can attain a higher moral existence and overcome the violent 
effects of its baser past. Rather, these arrangements too should be 
carefully studied. Working in tandem with lower-level restraints like 125
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the spread of literacy, or the inculcation of good manners (see Davidson 
1999, Elias 1994, Hunter 1988), the equilibrium of politics and law in 
question helps limit the violence of human collectivities as they operate 
in this world. While it would be churlish not to acknowledge that this 
equilibrium is far from perfect — as an achievement of this world it 
does not seek perfection, but it can certainly be improved — it is the 
best means yet developed for achieving social peace. If SLS were to 
study this capacity of this equilibrium in this way, it could not only 
value the benefits of this manner of ruling the social; it could also value 
the fact that the social needs to be ruled, not celebrated as a means to 
a higher moral existence. If SLS were to do these things, it would go 
a long way towards protecting law from morality’s stalking horse.
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